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Introduction
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the discussion regarding intersubjectivity in 
the critical- and post-critical work of Immanuel Kant. Beyond Kant’s aesthetic theory, 
intersubjectivity has been relatively underrepresented in the literature. Despite this, 
the thesis of this paper contends that universal intersubjective cognitive uniformity1, 
a transcendental idea which functions as a concept to distinguish Kantian judgments 
of taste, is in fact an implicit postulate of practical reason as the teleological condi-
tion of practical (i.e. social and moral) affairs within the Kantian system.
In addressing this question, I analyze and compare conceptual aspects across Kant’s 
epistemological, moral, and aesthetic philosophy. Firstly, I analyze § 30 through § 40 
of the “Deduction” in The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Second, I introduce sym-
pathia moralis, a concept briefly discussed in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Third, I 
argue that sympathia moralis is a materially binding subjective condition of morality, 
complementary to the categorical imperative and the existence of practical freedom. 
Fourth, I show that both the principle of taste and sympathia moralis are conditional 
upon UICU. Finally, I argue that the assumption of UICU is neither accident nor a pri-
ori principle. On the contrary, because no evidence sufficient for knowledge of UICU 
is directly intuitable, the need for effective communicability in any practical agency 
or social intercourse is sufficient to prove the primary need of practical reason to 
postulate UICU as a transcendental idea of pure practical reason.
I –– The Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments
Why do Pure Aesthetic Judgments Need a Deduction?
A Kantian “deduction” serves to justify assumption of an a priori principle by proving 
its necessity in making one judgment or another. Both transcendental deductions, 
for example, serve respectively to prove the necessity of the assumption of some 
unifying principle of experience in general.
Kant includes within objects of pure aesthetic judgment “the beautiful” and “that 
which we call sublime”. The wording here is key in highlighting a fundamental dis-
tinction: judgments of beauty attribute the quality “beautiful” to the object itself, 
whereas sublimity is never correctly predicated of objects. Sublimity, rather, is a feel-
1  Henceforth, UICU=universal intersubjective cognitive uniformity, and ISCU=intersubjective 
cognitive uniformity.
Pike | Sympathia Aesthetica
 commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans eP1190 | 3
ing evoked in one by reference to and so indirectly by a phenomenon. In other words, 
while an object can be beautiful (in perception), to call an object “sublime” is simply 
to speak of a feeling that refers to it. Judgment of sublimity is therefore wholly sub-
jective, and ipso facto does not require its own a priori principle–the judgment claims 
only the assent of the judging subject in question. A judgment of taste (–of beauty), 
however, does require deduction of its a priori principle argues Kant. The reasons for 
this are quite complex, and mostly comprise the two peculiarities of the judgment of 
taste:
namely, first, universal validity a priori, yet not a logical universality in 
accordance with concepts, but the universality of a singular judgment; 
second, a necessity (which must always rest on a priori grounds), which 
does not, however, depend on any a priori grounds of proof, by means of the 
representation of which the approval that the judgment of taste requires of 
everyone could be compelled.2
In other words: a deduction of its a priori principle is necessary since it is a judgment 
about experience, and yet a priori valid, not unlike, for example, empirical judgments 
about natural causation. The validity of the judgment must be grounded not in some 
a posteriori fact, but rather, in some aspect of the human experience itself––an a 
priori cognitive structure. Eva Schaper remarks on this point: “as universality and 
necessity are marks of the a priori [...] justificatory arguments will have to be of the 
transcendental kind.”3 I am inclined to agree with Schaper on this point––it is in fact 
the logical peculiarities themselves, presenting an “apparent paradox”4 which neces-
sitates deduction of the a priori principle.
The Peculiarities of Pure Aesthetic Judgments
The first peculiarity states that a judgment of taste is a singular judgment with uni-
versal validity a priori. Parsing this statement, the first claim is clear: a judgement of 
taste is a singular judgment. The second claim–namely, to a universal validity unlike 
logical universality in accordance with concepts–is much more complex. Since the 
2  Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:281.
3  Schaper, Eva. “Taste, sublimity, and genius: The aesthetics of nature and art” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
 375.
4  Ibid.
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judgment does not claim universality in accordance with concepts, it cannot be, for 
example, like the statement “the object is blue, because I recognize ‘blueness’ in my 
perception”. Beauty, insofar as it might be conceptual, in any case lacks this concep-
tual solidity or determinacy. For clarity, Kant writes: “to say ‘this flower is beautiful’ is 
the same as merely to repeat its own claim to everyone’s satisfaction.”5 The claim of 
beauty then must be much more like if one were to say: “It is blue, because it claims 
that everyone agree of its blueness”. This peculiarity, I must note, has less to do with 
truth and more with justification, and further, the burden of justification. The burden 
in a judgment of taste is neither placed on perceived nor perceiver, but in the phe-
nomenon of perception itself. To put it another way, beauty is vindicated neither by 
the object as it appears, nor by the knowledge of whom it appears to—the predicate 
of beauty is proven in the very perception of it.  A judgment of beauty, therefore, is 
not judgment about a fact, but is the fact itself: “It is beautiful because I judge it so”.
Paradoxically, the second peculiarity states that judgment of taste requires this assent 
of all not on a priori but a posteriori grounds. Yet, Kant writes: “The judgment of taste 
is not determinable by grounds of proof at all, just as if it were merely subjective”.6 
Here I read two major implications: 1) One cannot be convinced of an object’s beauty 
without having perceived the object; and 2) A judgment of beauty cannot be invali-
dated by any means of argumentation, once an object has been judged beautiful. 
The Justifying Principle of Judgments of Taste is Intersubjective Validity
From the two peculiarities, Kant gathers that there is no objective principle of taste. 
As noted above, the principle of taste must make use of some cognitive structure as 
well, since it has universal validity among embodied rational beings. Now, by “ob-
jective” principle, Kant refers to a concept furnished by intuitions, by which judg-
ment subsumes objects (as the faculty for subsuming particulars within universals). 
In other words, there are no empirical criteria gained in the apprehension of many 
beautiful objects, so that one might better judge beauty (the way one might judge an 
object to be blue, green, grue, or bleen).
The principle of taste, then, is at least partially subjective, though notably it is quite 
unlike other subjective judgments which are validated by their subjectivity alone (i.e. 
“I like x thing”). On this note, Henry Allison perceives a striking difference between 
judgments of agreeableness and judgments of taste, that “to call something agree-
5  CJ 5:282.
6  CJ 5:284.
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able is to claim that it actually gives rise to pleasure; and that to think of something 
as beautiful is to assume a necessary reference to liking”7. It seems plausible to infer 
from his observations on the peculiarities that these non-objective judgments are 
not wholly subjective either, since the feeling is neither evoked causally by nor char-
acteristic of the object itself. Because the principle of taste is neither an empirically 
furnished nor pure concept (i.e. cognitive structure), the judgment of taste is anoma-
lous, with a special distinct principle.
Kant writes: the principle “is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of 
a judgment in general [...] the faculty for judging, or the power of judgment”8 itself. 
Other a priori principles of judgment, pure concepts, have schemata, or structure, 
applicable to perceptions. For instance, a judgment of modality directly relates iden-
tifiable characteristics between a perception and categories of modality. The prin-
ciple of taste does not subsume a perception under a pure concept of the understand-
ing––rather it subsumes the state of certain cognitive faculties as they relate to a given 
perception. The criteria of beauty are not recognized in the apprehension of an object 
precisely because they are not in or of the object at all––conversely, they may not be 
identified in the judgment itself because there is no pure concept of formal beauty. 
Beauty, Kant argues, is apprehended formally by a specific state of harmony, achieved 
in the “free play” of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding. Fur-
ther, Kant argues, the pleasure recognized in this state is attributed to the object, 
and this necessary reference is why an object is predicated beautiful itself. What is 
asserted, then, is a pleasure not mine alone, but as well of any other agent who 1) 
perceives this object and 2) shares the structures of cognition which make this plea-
sure possible for me:
[I]t is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived in 
the mind as connected with the mere judging of an object that is represented 
in a judgment of taste as a universal rule for the power of judgment, valid for 
everyone. It is an empirical judgment that I perceive and judge an object 
with pleasure. But it is an a priori judgment that I find it beautiful, i.e., 
that I may require that satisfaction of everyone as necessary.9
7 Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Theory of Taste: a Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001),146.
8  CJ 5:287.
9  CJ 5:289, emphasis my own.
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To call an object beautiful and require the assent of others, then, presupposes some 
degree of ISCU between different (non-identical) beings. Conversely, if such a judg-
ment is not assented to by others, it would signify difference in cognitive faculties. 
The difficulty here, I must note, is that a presupposition of sameness must be made 
if Kant is to argue that judgments of taste really can hold validity in common human 
perception, and beyond simple speculation. Kant himself admits this difficulty in a 
footnote to the deduction:
In order to be justified in laying claim to universal assent [...] it is sufficient 
to admit [that] in all human beings, the subjective conditions of this faculty, 
as far as the relation of the cognitive powers therein set into action to a 
cognition in general is concerned, are the same, which must be true, since 
otherwise human beings could not communicate their representations 
and even cognition itself.10
It is not only that these assumptions must be made, however, but the former appears 
as the formal condition for the judgment’s possibility itself. And of course, it must be 
noted that because we are speaking of formal conditions of possibility, we are talk-
ing about a transcendental idea. What remains is the question of whether we must 
concern ourselves with:
1. a relational hypothesis about ISCU and intersubjective validity of judgments 
of taste, 
or;
2. an existential hypothesis about the ontological nature of UICU based on 
assumptions.
For my purposes, I do not feel it necessary to accept 2), regardless of Kant’s own be-
liefs. Statement 1) alone is sufficient to justify the thesis that UICU is a necessary 
postulate of practical reason. As such, I will reformulate the bolded portion of the 
above passage as: that UICU “must be [taken] to be true, since otherwise human be-
ings [would] not communicate their [...] cognition”. Written as hypothetical, it is clear 
that UICU is a condition of intersubject communication––I will be careful to note here 
that this relationship implies neither that there is or is not UICU either in terms of 
structures or concepts, nor anything about the communication itself. Merely that the 
assumption of UICU is required to communicate with others, since communication 
10 CJ 5:290n.
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would otherwise be deprived of its main function. Now, to show the role of the UICU 
condition in all contexts would be far beyond the scope of this paper. At present, I will 
focus primarily on the condition vis-a-vis the relationship between the principle of 
taste and the principle of morality.
II –– On a Deeper Relationship Between Morals and Aesthetics in Kant
The Duty to Humanity and the Categorical Imperative
Since Kant’s discussion on sympathia moralis is both brief and conceptually dense, 
I will quote it in full, though divided the passage into two sections. The first is as fol-
lows:
Sympathetic joy and sympathetic sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure (which are therefore called “aesthetic”) 
at another’s state of joy or pain (shared feeling, sympathetic feeling). 
Nature has already implanted in human beings receptivity to these feelings. 
But to use this as a means to promoting active and rational benevolence 
is still a particular, though only a conditional, duty. It is called the duty of 
humanity (humanitas) because a human being is regarded here not merely 
as a rational being but also as an animal endowed with reason. 11
Firstly, I’d like to compare sympathia as it appears here with the categorical impera-
tive12 itself. In the Groundwork, Kant formulates the CI in a number of ways, one of 
which is: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end”13. This is the formula of humanity (henceforth FOH). To treat humans 
as ends in themselves requires, as Schneewind suggests, “that the ends of others–if 
morally permissible–set limits on the ends we may ourselves pursue.”14 In a sense, 
what we can infer from this is that we must make the end of others our own, posi-
11  Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Lara Denis, trans. Mary J. Gregor, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 6:457.
12  Henceforth CI.
13  Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:429. Qtd. in Schneewind, J.B. “Autonomy, obligation, 
and virtue: An overview of Kant’s moral philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul 
Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 322.
14  Schneewind, 322.
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tively or negatively, insofar as those ends are rational. Schneewind suggests as well 
that Kant “allows that we will have permissible ends that will compete for time and 
resources with the morally required ends”15. In other words, while the categorical 
imperative makes promotion of the good a duty, it does not require that promotion 
of the good is the only duty—provided the amoral end in question does not violate 
the CI.
Compare this analysis of the CI with Kant’s definition of the duty of humanity as 
it appears in the Metaphysics of Morals. As quoted above: the duty to humanity is 
the duty “to use [the natural receptivity to the feelings of others, namely sympathia 
moralis,] as a means to promoting active and rational benevolence.” Immediately, 
this passage bears a striking resemblance to the FOH. Firstly, note that like the cat-
egorical imperative insists we ought to treat others as ends, the duty to humanity in-
sists on the promotion of benevolence, which Kant defines exactly as the wide duty 
of making the happiness of others one’s own ends.16 Further, Kant explicitly notes in 
the passage above that the duty of humanity requires that one must not merely pro-
mote benevolence, but like the CI states, must do so rationally. I will conclude, then, 
that the “duty to humanity” mentioned above refers to this formulation of the CI. If 
this is the case, then, since sympathia is a condition of the duty to humanity, it must 
also be a condition of any actions regarding the categorical imperative.
Sympathia Moralis, The Categorical Imperative, and the Principle of Taste
Now, humanity can be located either in the capacity and the will to share 
in others’ feelings (humanitas practica) or merely in the receptivity, given 
by nature itself, to the feeling of joy and sadness in common with 
others (humanitas aesthetica). The first is free, and is therefore called 
sympathetic (communio sentiendi liberalis); it is based on practical reason. 
The second is unfree (communio sentiendi illiberalis, servilis); it can be 
called communicable (since it is like receptivity to warmth or contagious 
diseases), and also compassion, since it spreads naturally among human 
beings living near one another. There is obligation only to the first.17
In second half of the passage, quoted above, Kant identifies two elements of sympa-
15  Schneewind, 324.
16  MM 160.
17  See n. 11.
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thy, marked respectively by (1) capacity and will, and (2) receptivity. Receptivity will 
be the focus of the present discussion.
Note, here, Kant’s musings on the latter point: “the receptivity, given by nature it-
self, to the feeling of joy and sadness in common with others”. Ought we not take 
Kant, here, to be suggesting that this receptivity is the capacity for shared feeling 
generally (analogous to the relationship between sensibility and intuitions)? Now, if 
this is the case, and this capacity is the condition of sympathy, the fact of emotional 
experience as subjective must then imply again some degree of ISCU if we are able 
to attribute this same state to others whose subjectivity remains largely inaccessible 
to me. Hence it is clear that ISCU is by no means restricted to Kant’s Aesthetic phi-
losophy; this assumption, which justifies the principle of taste, is the very same that 
justifies the categorical imperative, the supreme principle of Kantian moral judg-
ment.
III –– In Conclusion: Is Universal Intersubjective Cognitive Uniformity a Tran-
scendental Idea, or Postulate of Practical Reason?
In his paper “Beauty, Disinterested Pleasure, and Universal Communicability”, Bart 
Vandenabeele suggests that, for Kant, “an imputation of general assent in aesthetic 
pleasure is ‘only’ a transcendental idea. Against the rationalists, Kant insists that the 
required universal agreement in aesthetic judgments is always uncertain.” 18 In this 
passage, he is remarking upon Kant’s statement that:
The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone’s agreement (since 
only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce 
reasons); it merely requires this agreement from everyone, as an instance 
of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects confirmation not from 
concepts but from the agreement of others19
Now, in parsing both Kant’s statement and Vandenabeele’s observation, it is impor-
tant to remember two things. Firstly, the transcendental idea being referred to here 
is the universal assent in a judgment of taste. Second, note that while Kantian pos-
tulates are transcendental ideas, they are distinguished from transcendental ideas 
18  Vandenabeele 19
19  CJ 5:216; as quoted by Vandenabeele. For full transparency, I have opted here for Vandenabeele’s 
translation over the Cambridge for a number of reasons, most especially for the use of the word 
“requires” instead of “ascribes”, and “agreement” instead of “consent”.
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generally by their teleological function. The postulates of practical reason, are, for 
Kant, an extension of theoretical reason into the supersensible justified by the need 
of practical reason for ends in action. Notably, however, these postulates may not 
be used for any purpose other than satisfying a teleological need (i.e. they must not 
conflict with empirical or rational concepts or principles).20
Now, recall that pure judgments of taste, i.e. of beauty, do not postulate but rather 
assume that all will assent. As Kant writes: “It is an empirical judgment that I per-
ceive and judge an object with pleasure. But it is an a priori judgment that I find it 
beautiful”21. Kant is correct in supposing that the immediate assumption of the assent 
of everyone is not in fact a practical postulate, since mere agreement offers practical 
reason virtually no teleological value. It is not difficult to see however that the as-
sumption of the assent of all in a judgment of beauty is related to the UICU condition.
Now, when we speak of the mere agreement of all in a judgment of taste, we do so 
terms of communicability. When we speak of ISCU, however, we are speaking of su-
persensible or transcendental elements of cognition. Psychiatrist and philosopher 
R.D. Laing once wrote: “As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only 
its contents, but its flavor”, and while I am removing the terms from their original 
context, I find them useful to express these ideas. If we are able to communicate the 
“contents” of experience, if we can agree on these communicable contents, what 
remains incommunicable, untouchable, invisible, is the enigmatic flavour––when I 
communicate to you the conceptual contents of my experience, of my judgment of 
beauty, you understand them in your own terms, which may be entirely or slightly 
different from or exactly the same as the flavour of my own experience.
It is the content that we communicate, then. The agreement of others communicates 
an agreement on conceptually relevant content. A mutual understanding between 
friends of emotional states is an agreement between friends that the shape fits in the 
hole––only it must be assumed that the shape is, for us both, a circle, say. Were my 
shape a circle, and yours a square; my flavour tangy, and yours tart; and were we to 
recognize these discrepancies, our ability, or perhaps will, to communicate our expe-
riences to one another would be severely hindered––why explain my experience to 
you, if you couldn’t understand it the way I do? This anxiety, the desire to be under-
stood, and what is required for it, is captured succinctly by Vandenabeele. He writes: 
20 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J Gregor, (New 
York:Cambridge University Press, 1996), 124-126; 137-140.
21  See n. 9.
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“The demand for universal communicability [...] can serve as the basis for the univer-
sal validity of the aesthetic judgment.”22 What we may find here, then, is that while 
Kant is correct in saying that the assumption of universal agreement is not itself a 
postulate, it is conditional on the postulation of UICI, which, in short, is the teleologi-
cal condition of social and moral action in regards to other humans.
.
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